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 Corporate Tax Incentives and Capital Structure: New Evidence from UK Firm-Level 
Tax Returns 
 
Abstract 
We investigate how companies' capital structure is affected by corporate income taxes using 
confidential company-level tax returns for a large sample of UK firms. Exploiting variation in 
companies' marginal tax rates, we find a positive and substantial long-run tax effect on leverage. 
Leverage responds more to decreases in the marginal tax rate, and it responds to changes in the 
marginal rather than the average tax rate. Most importantly, we find that the marginal tax rate 
based on tax returns has greater explanatory power for companies' leverage than the marginal 
tax rate based on financial statements. Our study suggests that errors in the measurement for 
tax incentives using financial statements could lead to underestimation of the tax effects on 
capital structure. 
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1 Introduction
Corporation taxes typically permit a deduction for interest payments but not
the opportunity cost of equity nance. They therefore create an incentive to use
debt rather than equity nance. To test the e¤ects of tax on capital structure,
companiestax returns are a more accurate tool than nancial statements as they
indicate a companys tax position more precisely. Nonetheless, few studies have
used company-level corporate tax returns as such data are usually condential.
The literature has instead largely relied on accounting nancial statements to infer
companiestax positions, or simply used the statutory corporate income tax rate
as a proxy for the true tax incentives to use debt. What would be the estimated
tax e¤ects on capital structure if we can measure the tax incentives for borrowing
based on actual corporate tax returns? Moreover, would errors in the measurement
for tax incentives to borrow, in the absence of tax returns, lead to a biased estimate
for the tax e¤ect on capital structure? Our study investigates these two issues
by comparing the e¤ects on capital structure of two versions of the marginal tax
rate: one based on condential corporate tax returns and one based on nancial
statements for a same sample of UK companies.
Our study reduces errors in the measurement of tax incentives for using debt in
the following ways. Firstly and most importantly, we use company-level conden-
tial corporate tax returns, which are rarely used in previous studies. For a number
of reasons, such as earnings management and di¤erent requirements for tax and
nancial reporting, there could be substantial di¤erences between the tax charge
in the nancial statement and the current tax liability of the company reported to
the tax authority. Relative to accounting data from nancing statements, the tax
return data allow us to measure more precisely the tax incentives for companies
to borrow. This improvement in data quality is meaningfuldespite the theoretical
prediction for a positive link between the marginal tax rate and leverage (Modigliani
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and Miller, 1963), researchers often nd it di¢ cult to identify this association em-
pirically. Myers (1984) calls this phenomenon the capital structure puzzle" and
challenges researchers to show that capital structure is a¤ected by taxes as the
trade-o¤ theory predicts. Although recent studies (for example, Barclay, Heitzman,
and Smith, 2013; Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015; Doidge and Dyck, 2015) are more
successful in identifying the tax e¤ects, it remains a question whether measurement
errors in tax incentives lead to underestimation of the true tax e¤ect on corporate
leverage. Having access to both tax returns and nancial statements for the same
company, we are able to address this issue directly.
Secondly, we match companiesmarginal tax rates based on tax returns with
leverage ratios based on nancial statements using the same consolidation rule. In
contrast, most existing studies of large public companies match companiesworld-
wide consolidated leverage ratios with the tax rates of the jurisdictions where the
headquarters are located. However, as far as multinational companies borrow in
di¤erent countries, their aggregate borrowing should depend on tax rates in those
di¤erent countries (Desai et al., 2004; Huizinga et al., 2008; Arena and Roper,
2010). Our data is free of such measurement errors due to data mismatch, since we
exploit only unconsolidated data of UK companies on taxation from tax returns
and on other variables from unconsolidated nancial accounts.
In our study, variation in companiesmarginal tax rates arises due to both the
largely progressive corporation tax rate schedule and a number of tax reforms in
the UK. Kinks in the UK marginal tax rate schedule, where there are jumps in the
marginal tax rate, are signicant. For example, at the £ 300,000 kink in the tax
rate schedule, the marginal tax rate has typically jumped by 12 to 13 percentage
points. Among the several kinks in the rate schedule, we also consider one that is
more often investigated in the literature the e¤ective marginal tax rate for interest
deduction is lower for a company with taxable losses than that for a company with
positive taxable prots even if the statutory tax rate is at (Graham, 1996a, 1996b).
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During our sample period, there were also a few tax reforms which create additional
variation in companiesmarginal tax rates, although the magnitude of these tax rate
changes is often small.1
The main ndings of our study are as follows. Based on calculating the marginal
tax rate from tax returns matched with nancial statement variables, we estimate
that in the long run a one percentage point rise in the corporation tax rate would
increase the leverage ratio of private companies by around 1 percentage point (our
central estimates range from 0.76 to 1.40, depending on the instruments used).
This result suggests that our sample rms are strongly responsive to changes in
tax incentives for borrowing. Interestingly, for the same set of companies, we nd a
much smaller and insignicant estimate for the tax e¤ects on capital structure when
we measure tax incentives to borrow based on companiesnancial statements. We
also nd substantial book-tax di¤erences for companies in our sample. These results
suggest that the large measurement errors in the tax incentives in the absence of
tax returns are likely to lead to underestimation of the true tax e¤ects on corporate
leverage.
We nd that rms in our study close about 24% of the gap between their ac-
tual leverage ratio and the targeted level each year, close to the adjustment speed
estimated by Lemmon et al. (2008) using a similar estimation method. We nd
some asymmetric tax e¤ect on leverage for private rms in our samplethey respond
more to a decrease in the tax incentive than to an increase in the tax incentive. The
strong tax e¤ect on leverage is found both among UK domestic stand-alone compa-
nies and those belong to a multinational company group. Moreover, we investigate
whether companies adjust their capital structure with respect to changes in the
theoretically correct marginal tax rate or the average tax rate, which may be more
1The standard corporate income tax rate was cut from 30% to 28% in 2008; a 0%-10% starting
rate was applied to prots below £ 10,000 during scal years 2001-2005; and for small UK compa-
nies, the corporate income tax rate was cut from 21% to 20% in 1999, and to 19% in 2002. It was
then increased to 20% in 2007 and to 21% in 2008. For a more detailed description of the changes
in the UK tax system, see Ma¢ ni et el. (2016).
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salient. By running a horse-race between the two tax rates, we nd that rms in
our sample only respond to changes in the marginal tax rate. Taken together, our
ndings are strongly consistent with the trade-o¤ theory of capital structure.
It is worth noting that the purpose of our study is to estimate the tax e¤ects
on capital structure using the marginal tax rate based on actual rm-level tax
returns, and to understand whether measurement errors in the marginal tax rate
based on nancial statements of the same rm would materially a¤ect the estimated
tax e¤ects on its capital structure choice. Our purpose is not to compare our
estimated tax e¤ects on capital structure with those found in previous studies. To
achieve meaningful comparison with previous studies, we would need to use similar
data (such as data provided by Compustat), focus on a similar group of countries,
and use similar econometric specications and estimation methods. Di¤erences in
these dimensions will lead to di¤erent results as surveyed by Feld et al. (2013).
Nonetheless, given that the discrepancy between tax and nancial reporting is a
common phenomenon, our study sheds some light on possible outcomes when tax
return data can be matched with accounting data used by previous studies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briey review existing
studies using tax returns to investigate the tax e¤ects on leverage decisions. In
Section 3, we develop a simple theoretical model to illustrate how rms choose
leverage when the corporate tax rate schedule contains more than one marginal rate.
Section 4 describes our empirical model. Section 5 describes the data and sample
selection. Section 6 reports our benchmark estimation results. Section 7 discuss
whether our measure of the marginal tax rate better captures the tax incentive
to use debt, relative to the marginal tax rate based on publicly available nancial
statements and the more salient average e¤ective tax rate. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Literature review
There has been a large body of empirical studies analyzing the e¤ects of the
corporate tax system on rmscapital structure. Graham (2003) provides a sur-
vey of literature on this topic. More recent studies, however, are more successful
in identifying the tax e¤ects. Using changes in the top corporate income tax rate
across OECD countries during 1981-2009, Faccio and Xu (2015) nd that corpo-
rate leverage increases on average by 0.41% when the corporate income tax rate
increases by 1%. Barclay, Heitzman, and Smith (2013) nd that leverage ratios
of taxable real estate rms are higher than their nontaxable counterparts. Heider
and Ljungqvist (2015) use variation in state-level corporate income tax rates in the
United States and in their benchmark estimations, one percentage point increase in
the state-level corporate income tax rate is associated with 0.38 percentage point
increase in corporate leverage. Doidge and Dyck (2015) investigate the e¤ects on
corporate policies when corporate tax was imposed on Canadian trusts in 2006,
and nd that these a¤ected trusts increased leverage following the policy change.
On the other hand, using long time series, Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2014) nd
little statistical association between the statutory corporate tax rates and aggregate
leverage of US unregulated industrial rms during 1925-2010.2
The literature varies widely in terms of how to measure tax incentives for bor-
rowing. As pointed out by Feld et al. (2013), the choice of tax incentive measures
signicantly a¤ects the estimated tax impact on leverage. Some studies measure tax
incentives using the top statutory corporate income tax rate (for example, Faccio
and Xu, 2015). Nonetheless, the top statutory marginal tax rate is likely to be an
inaccurate indicator of the true tax incentive for using debt, especially if the tax
rate schedule is not at. It is also well known that rms in the tax exhaustion posi-
tion face a lower marginal tax rate than the statutory rate. Graham (1996a, 1996b)
2While Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2014) nd no link between aggregate leverage and corpo-
rate tax rates, they nd a positive association between corporate tax rates and the choice between
debt and preferred equity.
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proposes the use of the simulated marginal tax rate which captures the di¤erent tax
incentives for borrowing for loss-making rms. There are many advantages of using
the more sophisticated simulated marginal tax rate. Nonetheless, if the calculation
of the simulated marginal tax rate is based on nancial statements, measurement
errors will still occur (Barclay, Heitzman, and Smith, 2013) and they could be po-
tentially large due to the book-tax di¤erencesrms taxable income reported in
nancial statements is usually di¤erent from taxable income reported to tax au-
thorities. Book-tax di¤erences arise due to di¤erent requirements for nancial and
tax reporting as well as earnings management. A large book-tax di¤erence has also
been regarded in the literature as an indicator of tax aggressiveness. Manzon and
Plesko (2001) and Desai (2003) report that since the early 1990s, the gap between
book income and taxable income for US public rms has been increasing, likely due
to increasing tax sheltering activities.
As the divergence between book and taxable income increases, it is thus interest-
ing to investigate whether using tax returns would a¤ect the estimated tax e¤ects
on corporate leverage. To investigate this issue requires access to both tax returns
and nancial statements, which explain the paucity of studies that have attempted
to do so. In fact, only a few papers have used actual tax return data and within the
few exceptions, aggregated tax returns over companies rather than company-level
tax returns are more often used (Gordon and Lee, 2001; Dwenger and Stainer, 2014;
Longsta¤ and Strebulaev, 2014) largely due to condentiality restrictions.3
One relevant study is Graham and Mills (2008) who simulate the e¤ective mar-
ginal tax rates using both tax return data and nancial statements for a sample
of US public companies during the period 1998-2000. Graham and Mills (2008)
nd a positive correlation between the two marginal tax rates and the simulated
marginal tax rate based on nancial statements has a stronger explanatory power
for rmsleverage. Nonetheless, caution is needed to interpret this result since their
3Tax return data in these studies are aggregated according to rm size, their industries, or
locations of headquarters.
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tax returns and nancial statements are based on di¤erent consolidation rules: un-
consolidated tax returns led in the US were matched with consolidated worldwide
nancial statements, and the leverage is measured based on consolidated worldwide
balance sheets. 4 Perhaps for this reason, as pointed out by the authors themselves,
the simulated marginal tax rate based on nancial statements better explains rms
worldwide consolidated leverage in their study.
3 A simple theoretical model of debt with two
tax rates
In this section, we use a simple theoretical model to illustrate how tax a¤ects
corporate capital structure when there are two marginal tax rates. Consider a rm
that aims to maximize its shareholder value, Vt, dened as:
Vt = Dt + E(Vt+1) (1)
where  is the shareholders discount factor,  = 1=(1+), and  is the shareholders
discount rate. Dt is dividend paid to the shareholder in period t, which equals to:
Dt = F (Kt 1)  It +Bt   (1 + r)Bt 1   (Bt 1)  Tt (2)
where F (Kt 1) is the value of the rms output, which depends on the capital stock
at the end of the previous period, Kt 1, It is new investment in period t, Bt is new
one-period debt issued in period t, r is the interest rate, and (Bt 1) is a convex
4For tax purposes, a U.S. parent corporation typically les a consolidated tax return that
includes net income or loss only from all its domestic subsidiaries plus repatriations of prots from
the foreign subsidiaries.
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cost of borrowing. Tt is taxation, dened as:
Tt =
8><>: LYt if Yt < HLH + H(Yt  H) if Yt  H (3)
where Yt is taxable prot, dened as:
Yt = F (Kt 1)  Kt 1   rBt 1
and there is a progressive rate schedule, with a marginal rate of L below the
threshold H, and a marginal rate of H above H, with H > L. The rate of
depreciation relief for capital expenditure is assumed for simplicity to be equal
to the true depreciation rate, . The equation of motion of the capital stock is
Kt = (1  )Kt 1 + It.
The rm chooses Kt and Bt to maximize Vt. The rst-order conditions are:
Kt :
8><>: FK(K

t )   = 1 L if Yt < H
FK(K

t )   = 1 H if Yt > H
(4)
Bt :
8><>: 
0(Bt ) =   r(1  L) if Yt < H
0(Bt ) =   r(1  H) if Yt > H
(5)
These rst-order conditions indicate that the optimal level of debt is positively
related with the rms marginal tax rate, given its tax bracket. In contrast, the
optimal level of capital stock is a¤ected negatively by the rms marginal tax rate
since FK(Kt) < 0. Therefore, our theoretical model predicts that all else equal, an
increase in the rms marginal tax rate will result in a higher level of debt and a
lower level of capital stock in the equilibrium, which implies a higher leverage ratio.
The key point that we want to make here is that, although the optimal level of
debt (and the capital stock) depends on whether taxable prot is below or above
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the threshold, this does not depend on whether taxable prot before interest (Zt =
Yt + rBt 1) is above or below the threshold. That is, if Yt < H, the optimal level of
debt is independent of whether Zt < H or Zt > H. To put it another way, suppose
that Zt > H, the rm then is incentivized to use more debt because at the margin
it initially faces a high tax rate, H . This may take the rm to the threshold. But
if we observe the rm at a position strictly below the threshold, then the usual
rst-order condition using L must apply, and the higher tax rate H is irrelevant.
In our empirical analysis, we therefore use the after-nancing marginal tax rate as
a proxy for the tax incentives to use debt that rms face.
Note that the rst order conditions are not dened at the threshold where Yt =
H. At this point we have only that 
1 L < FK(K

t )    < 1 H , and r(1   H) <
   0(Bt ) < r(1   L). In our empirical analysis, we therefore also estimate
the impact of tax while excluding companies that are close to the threshold as a
robustness check (Section 6.2).
4 Empirical model
The literature suggests that leverage is highly persistent over time due to ad-
justment costs (Fischer et al., 1989; Hovakimian and Titman, 2001; Flannery and
Ragan, 2006; Lemmon et al., 2008). To capture this adjustment process, we use a
general dynamic adjustment model of leverage specied as Equation (6) similar to
that used by Lemmon et al. (2008):
Levi;t = 0+1Levi;t 1+1MTRi;t+2MTRi;t 1+1Zi;t+2Zi;t 1+i+t+i;t (6)
where Levi;t is the leverage ratio of company i in year t. As discussed in Section
3, conditional on the observed tax brackets, rms tax incentives to borrow are
captured by the after-tax marginal tax rate. Thus, we use the variable MTRi;t,
the after-nancing marginal tax rate faced by company i in year t, as the key
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explanatory variable. We control for a vector of rm-level non-tax characteristics
Zi;t, which likely a¤ect leverage, including size, tangibility, and protability. i
is an unobserved company-specic xed e¤ect; t is a time e¤ect; and i;t is an
unobserved company-level, time-varying shock.
Re-arranging Equation (6), we obtain an error-correction specication:
4Levi;t = 0 + (1   1)Levi;t 1 + (1 + 2)MTRi;t 1 + (1 + 2)Zi;t 1 + 14MTRi;t
+14 Zi;t + i + t + i;t (7)
where the long-run e¤ect of the corporate tax rate on leverage is given by (1 +
2)=(1   1), and (1   1) measures the convergence speed of the leverage ratio
towards its long-run target. Similarly, the long-run e¤ect of other control variables
in (7) is measured as (1 + 2)=(1   1). The Error Correction Model nests the
partial adjustment and accelerator models as special cases, which has the advantage
of separating the long-run determinants of the level of leverage from the short-run
adjustment dynamics. Our empirical specication is similar to the partial adjust-
ment model reported in Lemmon et al. (2008). Equation (7) is estimated using the
di¤erence GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). As discussed in details by
Flannery and Hankins (2013), with xed e¤ects and the lag dependent variable on
the right hand side, the di¤erence GMM estimator can consistently estimate the
speed of adjustment and coe¢ cients on other independent variables and hence, is a
better option for estimating dynamic panel data than the Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) and the Fixed-E¤ects (FE) estimators.
It is worth noting that we treat the marginal tax rate as endogenous in the
di¤erence GMM estimations. Suppose the MTRs follow the process MTRi;t =
MTRi;t 1 + i;t where 0 <jj < 1 and i;t is an i.i.d. process. If i;t is correlated
with i;t (E[i;t; i;t] 6= 0), we have E[MTRi;t; i;t] 6= 0. For example, a rm that
experiences large positive demand shocks in year t may have more internal funds
10
and higher taxable prots. Consequently, the rm may have both high marginal
tax rate and low incentive to borrow, which would be consistent with the pecking-
order theory of capital structure. In the rst-di¤erenced equation, the endogeneity
of MTRi;t implies E[4MTRi;t;4i;t] 6= 0 and E[4MTRi;t 1;4i;t] 6= 0. Conse-
quently, the estimate for the coe¢ cient, b1, and the estimate for the long-run tax
e¤ect on leverage, (b1+b2)=(1 b1), are both likely to be biased. To deal with this
issue, we use an instrumental variables estimation approach that is standard in the
dynamic panel literature (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982). This method has recently
been used by Weber (2014) to analyze a similar issue.5 Suppose that the error term
i;t is not serially correlated, then we have
E[MTR0i;t l 4 i;t] = 0 (8)
for l > 1
Equation (8) indicates we can useMTRt 2 and further lags ofMTR as instruments
for MTRi;t in the di¤erence GMM estimations, which holds even when MTRs are
persistent (0 <  < 1). However, if there is rst-order serial correlation in i;t,
we will have E[i;t 2; i;t 1] 6= 0 and E[MTR0i;t 2;4i;t] 6= 0. This means that we
can only use MTRt 3 and further lags of MTR as instruments. In practice, we
formally test the order of serial correlation in i;t and nd rst-order but no higher
order serial correlation. Thus, we use lagged MTR, lagged leverage, protability,
tangibility and rm size (dated at t-3 and t-4) as the set of instruments in the
di¤erence GMM estimations. In principle, we can use lag variables dated at t-3
and earlier as instruments. We choose to use only lag variables dated at t-3 and t-4
since our panel data is short in T . Using lag variables dated earlier is also likely to
lead to weak instruments. We formally test the validity of our IVs using the Hansen
5Weber (2014) estimates the elasticity of individual taxable income with respect to the tax
rate. A similar endogeneity problem arises as the personal tax rate is likely to be correlated with
the unobserved shocks, which in turn a¤ects taxable income.
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test. As an alternative strategy, we use the lags of the before-nancing MTR, and
the lags of leverage, protability, tangibility and size (all dated at t-3 and t-4) as
a new set of instruments. It is worth noting that some studies use directly the
before-nancing marginal tax rate as the explanatory variable in the estimations.
However, our theoretical model in Section 3 suggests that rmsoptimal debt policy
does not depend on the before-nancing marginal tax rate, although it may serve
as an instrument for MTRi;t.
To achieve identication of Equation (7), we rely on changes in the UK statutory
corporate income tax and on the fact that the corporation tax rate schedule in
the UK has several marginal rates during scal years 2001-2009. We start with
2001, the earliest year we have access to rms tax returns. Figure 1 illustrates
the marginal tax rate schedule graphically in scal years 2001 and 2008. Figure 1
shows some substantial jumps in the statutory marginal tax rate, for example at
the £ 300,000 threshold for taxable prot. Another signicant kink arises due to
the zero starting rate for companies with less than £ 10,000 taxable prots in place
between scal years 2002 and 2005. Appendix A reports the statutory marginal
tax rate associated with each bracket of taxable prot during our sample period in
more details.
Several factors may confound our identication. First, it is possible in principle
that the corporation tax gains to greater use of debt are outweighed to some extent
by the taxation of the interest received by the lender (Miller, 1977). However,
there is no reason to suppose that corporation tax rates might be correlated with
the variation in tax rates of the lenders and thus, our empirical strategy remains
valid. There was also little change in the personal income tax rate schedule in the
UK during our sample period. Second, a rm may shift into a higher tax bracket
when it grows more protable, larger in size, or more tangible. Absent the changes
in tax incentives, the rm may still lever up in such cases as it becomes easier to
borrow. Throughout our analysis, we then control for rmsprotability, size, and
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tangibility. In this way, we are likely to separate out the tax e¤ects on leverage.
5 Sample construction and data description
5.1 Sample construction
We use condential tax returns collected by Her Majestys Revenue and Cus-
toms (HMRC), the UK tax authority, which covers the universe of companies that
le a corporate income tax return in the UK during scal years 2001-2009.6 Data
before 2001 is not available. UK tax returns are led on an unconsolidated basis.
The tax return data provides precise information on the tax position of each com-
pany in each period. However, it contains little information on nancial statement
variables. In particular, it does not contain information on debt or interest pay-
ments. We therefore merge the tax return data with the unconsolidated accounting
data from the nancial statement database FAME (provided by Bureau van Dijk)
by the company identication number, and the end dates of the tax-returns and the
nancial statements.7 As the capital structure of nancial companies is a rather
di¤erent concept from that of non-nancial companies, we exclude the nancial
sector from our analysis.
We use information from balance sheets to construct the leverage ratio, dened
as the sum of short-term and long-term debt expressed as a proportion of total
debt and book equity.8 As a large proportion of rms in the tax returns did not
report any information about their debt in FAME, we lose a considerable number
of observations.9 We include company size, tangibility and protability as our
6The UK corporate tax return form is called the CT600 form. The condential tax return
data is accessible to UK based researchers and it is provided by the HMRC through the secured
Datalab.
7Each rm is assigned a unique identier (ID) in both the tax return data and the accounting
data by the HMRC. We use this rm ID to carry out the matching. We keep only rms with 12
months in each accounting period, which are the majority of rms in our sample.
8As rms in our sample are private, we do not observe the market value of their equity. Hence,
book equity is included in the denominator of the leverage ratio.
9In unreported exercises, we compare the size, tangibility and protability between rms with
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main control variables since these have been found to be among the most reliable
factors for explaining leverage (Frank and Goyal, 2009; Graham and Leary, 2011).
Appendix B provides a detailed description of the variable construction for our
empirical analysis.
Each company in the sample reports at least 4 consecutive years of observations
after we winsorize key variables at the bottom and top 1 percent, which is neces-
sary to implement our estimations.10 The nal sample contains 16,124 companies
and 93,259 company-year observations (the full sample), of which 9,439 compa-
nies (51,051 company-year observations) never experienced taxable losses during
the sample period (the positive-prot-only sample). Throughout our analysis, we
will pay special attention to the positive-prot-only sample since the tax returns
provides the most accurate measure for the tax incentives to use debt for this type
of rms and hence, estimations based on this sample is largely free of measurement
errors in the tax variable.
Firms in our sample are private, around 70% of the which are domestic stand-
alone businesses while the rest belongs to a corporate group. Our sample only
consists of private rms as a result of matching tax returns with nancial state-
ments. As mentioned previously, we match unconsolidated tax returns with uncon-
solidated nancial statements for consistency. However, for listed rms Amadeus
generally only provides consolidated accounts, which cannot be matched with tax
returns compiled on an unconsolidated basis. Consequently, our matched sample
only contains private rms.
Panel A of Table 1 provides summary statistics of key variables based on the
positive-prot-only sample. Panel B reports summary statistics of key variables
for rms that experienced losses at least once during the sample period.11 The
and without leverage information in FAME. We nd that rms without leverage information tend
to be smaller, less tangible, and less protable.
10We choose to winsorize variables rather than to exclude observations with extreme values so
that the sample size will not be reduced.
11As a result, Panel B of Table 1 is based on rm-year observations that are not in the positive-
prot-only sample but are in the full sample.
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average leverage ratio for private rms in our sample is rather highclose to 50%
in both samples. This is consistent with Brav (2009) in that private rms rely
more heavily on debt as a source of nancing, compared with publicly traded rms.
Mechanically, rms in the positive-prot-only sample report more taxable prots
and higher marginal tax rates on average, relative to the rms that experienced
losses. We also observe that prot-making rms tend to be larger and less tangible.
In Panel C, we conduct the t test and the Wilcoxon test of the null hypothesis
that the two groups of rms have equal means of taxable prots, the after-tax
marginal tax rate, size, tangibility, protability and leverage. Both the t test and
the Wilcoxon test strongly reject the null hypothesis of equal means across the two
samples (the p-values of these statistics are essentially zero). It is worth noting that
the number of observations is large for both samples, which could explain why the
t test and the Wilcoxon test statistics are substantial.
5.2 Descriptive analysis of marginal tax rates
Figure 2 plots the distribution of companiesstatutory marginal tax rates based
on the full sample for the period 2001-2009. For loss-making rm-year observations,
we assume that the marginal tax rate is zero when plotting these gures.12 Figure
2 shows rich variation in both measures of marginal tax rates across companies.
Table 2 reports the transitional probability matrix for companiestaxable prots
from year t-1 to year t, shown separately for the positive-prot-only sample and
the full sample. Table 2 reveals persistence in allocations to tax brackets for rms
in both samples. For rms always making positive taxable income, the probability
of staying within the same tax bracket from period t-1 to period t is around 70%-
80%. Firmsloss-making status is also rather persistent: when a company is in the
loss-making position in period t-1, with around 70% probability it would remain
12Firms with taxable prots below £ 10,000 during the scal years 2002-2005 faced zero statutory
marginal tax rate, which adds to the mass at zero in Figure 2.
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non-taxable in period t. Despite the persistence, there is still considerable time-
series variation in companiestax status as suggested by the non-zero o¤-diagonal
gures in Table 2. Together with a number of tax rate reforms during the sample
period, these changes in companiestax status create rich variation in the marginal
tax rate which we can exploit.
As a further check, Table 3 reports the number of tax status changes within
companies. For the positive-prot-only sample, around a quarter of companies
never changed their tax brackets. These rms serve as the control group in our
estimations. Around 28% of companies changed their location on the tax rate
schedule once and more than 20% of companies changed their location on the rate
schedule at least three times. At the £ 300,000 threshold, around 35% of companies
in the positive-prot-only sample moved into or out of this tax bracket at least once
during the sample period. For the full sample, around 80% of rms changed tax
bracket at least once during the sample period, and around half of the companies
moved in or out of taxable losses at least once.
6 Estimating tax e¤ects on capital structure based
on tax returns
6.1 Benchmark result
We begin our estimation using the positive-prot-only sample, for which we can
most accurately measure tax incentives for borrowing faced by rms. Without loss
making rms, we precisely observe rmsmarginal tax rates and hence, estimations
should be largely free of measurement errors. Table 4 reports the estimation results
based on Equation (7). We apply the di¤erence GMM estimator (Arellano and
Bond, 1991), which uses the set of instruments as we explained in Section 4.13
13We conduct the GMM estimation using the STATA command xtabond2 (Roodman, 2009).
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As our benchmark instrumenting strategy, we use the lags of MTR, the lags
of leverage, protability, tangibility and rm size, as the set of instruments for
MTRi;t in the GMM estimations. We also specify other control variables and
the lag dependant variable as endogenous. As discussed previously, we use lag
variables dated at t-3 and t-4 as instruments based on the serial correlation test
of i;t (reported in Table 4), which suggests rst-order serial correlation in i;t.
Note that if the error term i;t is not serially correlated, we would reject the null
hypothesis that there is no AR(1) type of serial correlation in i;t, and we would
accept the null hypothesis that there is no higher order of serial correlation in the
error term of the rst-di¤erenced equation. In Table 4, we strongly reject the null
hypothesis that there is no AR(1) or AR(2) type of serial correlation in i;t, but
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no AR(3) type of serial correlation
in i;t. Correspondingly, these results suggest that there is AR(1) but no higher-
order serial correlation in i;t and thus, only the third or further lags of variables in
our instrument set could be valid instruments as discussed earlier.
In Column 1, the GMM estimation yields positive estimates for coe¢ cients on
both4MTRi;t and onMTRi;t 1. We obtain a positive and signicant long-run tax
e¤ect on leverage that is around 0.76. The estimated convergence speed is around
0.24, which is close to that estimated by Lemon et al. (2008) regarding large US
listed non-nancial rms in their GMM estimations. The Hansen test cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the IVs are exogeneous even at the 10 percent level (the
p-value of the test statistics is 0.754).
As a robustness check, in Column 2 we include the lags of the before-nancing
MTR, rather than the lags of the after-nancing MTR, in the set of instruments.
Here, we continue to obtain a positive and signicant long-run tax e¤ect on leverage,
and the magnitude of the point estimate onMTRIV before is around 1.397. Nonethe-
less, this point estimate is associated with a larger standard error than that of the
point estimate on MTR in Column 1. This result is not surprising as compared
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with the lags of the MTR, the lags of the before-nancing MTR are less strongly
correlated with the current after-nancing MTR.
In Columns 3-5, we use the full sample including loss-making observations. A
marginal increase in the interest cost of a loss-making company does not typically
have an immediate impact on tax liabilities, but instead increases the tax loss
carried forward to set against prot in subsequent periods. UK rms are allowed
to carry losses back for 12 months or forward indenitely.14 Additional variation
in the marginal tax rate is therefore introduced and its value depends on how long
the company expects to reach a positive taxable prot. There have been a number
of attempts to estimate such e¤ective tax rates, the best-known being Graham
(1996a).15 In our study, we consider two approaches: we either setMTR to zero for
loss-making observations or use the perfect-foresightmarginal tax rate (PMTR).
The PMTR is constructed assuming rms can fully anticipate their future tax
status. In practice, we use the tax returns to decide whether and when loss-making
rms became taxable again, or whether the rm carried loss back. PMTR is set to
0 if the rm made losses throughout the sample period. We provide more details
about the construction of the PMTR in Appendix B. It is worth noting that both
the MTR and PMTR for loss-making observations may deviate from the true tax
incentives for borrowing, given the strong assumptions we make when constructing
these variables. Thus, estimations based on the full sample is likely to be a¤ected
by measurement errors.
Column 3 reports GMM estimation results assuming MTR is zero for loss-
making rms. Here, we use the lags of MTR, together with the lags of leverage,
protability, tangibility and rm size, in the di¤erence GMM estimation. We nd
14Note that companies are also, subject to some limitations, able to set losses in one company
against prot in another company in the same group, in which case, the relevant tax rate is in
principle that of the group member to which losses are transferred. We do not observe the recipient
company. However, only around 5% of rms in our sample are part of a UK domestic group.
15See also the earlier studies that exploit cross-section variation in marginal tax rates due to
losses (Shevlin, 1987, 1990; Devereux, 1989; Devereux et al., 1994; and Altshuler and Auerbach,
1990).
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a long-run tax e¤ect on the leverage ratio of around 1.04, which is signicant at the
1 percent level. One caveat is that we do not observe the actual amount of losses
that rms made in the tax returnsthe taxable income is simply recorded as zero in
this case. Therefore, we cannot calculate the before-nancing MTR for loss-making
observations and consequently, we do not use the lags of the before-nancingMTR
as instruments for the full sample. Columns 4 reports the GMM estimation result
using PMTR as the proxy for the tax incentives, and we use the lags of the PMTR
instead of lags ofMTR in the set of instruments. In Column 4, we obtain a long-run
tax e¤ect of around 0.98. One concern about PMTR is that, as explained in more
details in Appendix B, we impose especially strong assumptions about the rst and
the last observations in the sample for each company if it is in a loss-making position
in those years: if the rm made a loss when it rst appears in the sample, we do
not observe whether the company carried losses backward; and if a rm made a
loss when it exit the sample, we do not observe whether it carried loss forward in
the future. Therefore, in Column 5 we repeat the approach of Column 4 but omit
the rst and the last observations for each rm. Despite the smaller sample, the
long-run coe¢ cient on PMTRExclude in Column 5 has a similar magnitude to that
on PMTR in Column 4.
Throughout Table 4, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that our set of instru-
ments are exogenous. In fact, apart from Column 4, the p-value associated with
the Hansen test statistics exceeds the 10 percent level. The serial correlation test
of the error term suggests AR(1) but no higher-order serial correlation in i;t. The
serial correlation test of the error term lends further support for our choice of lag
orders for our IVs. We obtain similar serial correlation test results in tables in the
rest of the paper and hence, we do not report the statistics for brevity.16
16The serial correlation test results are available upon request.
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6.2 Excluding bunchers
One remaining confounding factor is that rms may use debt to shift into a
lower tax bracket. Such rmstaxable income would likely bunch just below the
threshold. To investigate this issue, we plot the distribution of rmstaxable income
based on the positive-prot-only sample in Figure 3. Figure 3 shows the number
of rms in each bin of taxable income based on the tax returns, where the bin
width is set to be £ 20,000. Without kinks in the corporate tax rate schedule,
the distribution of taxable income is likely to be smooth. However, we observe
signicant bunching of taxable income around the £ 300,000 threshold. To have a
closer look, Figure 4 plots the distribution of taxable income (the red line) around
the £ 10,000, £ 50,000, £ 300,000, and £ 1,500,000 thresholds, respectively. These
detailed gures show more clearly that bunching of taxable income mostly occurs
around the £ 10,000 and £ 300,000 thresholds. Interestingly, when we focus on the
before-nancing taxable income (brown bars), its distribution appears to be smooth
around all the kink points. Nevertheless, the distribution of taxable income before
deducting capital allowances (and after deducting interest expenses) is also smooth
(the black line). Hence, it is likely that rms use debt as well as other tax shields,
such as capital allowances, to shift just below the threshold.
In Table 5, we repeat the exercises as in Table 4 but excluding bunching rms
around the £ 10,000 and £ 300,000 thresholds. More specically, we drop rms with
taxable prots between £ 9,600 and £ 10,000, and between £ 290,500 and £ 300,000.
In unreported exercises, we use wider ranges to identify the bunching rms but
results are not sensitive to this choice. Excluding bunching rms reduces our sam-
ple size. We report the GMM estimation results based on the positive-prot-only
sample in Columns 1 and 2. In Column 1, we report the GMM estimation results
using our benchmark instrumenting strategy. In Column 2, we use the lags of the
before-nancing MTR in the set of instruments instead. Excluding these bunching
rms barely changes our benchmark estimation results. We continue to nd a sub-
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stantial positive tax e¤ect on corporate leverage in the long run, whose magnitude
is similar to that reported in Table 4.
In Column 3 and 4, we report the GMM estimation results when we exclude
bunching observations from the full sample. Ideally, we would also like to exclude
observations bunching just below the zero taxable income for the full sample, but
this is impossible because the taxable prots are truncated at zero in the tax returns.
With this caveat in mind, we continue to nd a long-run tax e¤ect on leverage
similar to the corresponding columns in Table 4, regardless whether we use the
MTR (Column 3) or the PMTR (Column 4) as the proxy for the tax incentives to
use debt.
6.3 Asymmetric tax e¤ects
Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) nd that tax increases a¤ect rmscapital struc-
ture di¤erently from tax decreases. To test whether the tax e¤ects are asymmetric
in our sample, we construct a dummy variable Increasei;t that equals 1 if rm is
marginal tax rate based on the tax returns increases from year t  1 to year t. We
then interact this dummy variable with both MTRi;t 1 and 4MTRi;t and include
these interaction terms as additional regressors in Equation (7). More specically,
we estimate the specication below using the di¤erence GMM estimator:
4Levi;t = 0 + (1   1)Levi;t 1 + (1 + 2)MTRi;t 1 + 3Increasei;t MTRi;t 1
+(1 + 2)Zi;t 1 + 14MTRi;t + 4Increasei;t 4MTRi;t
+14 Zi;t + i + t + i;t (9)
The results are reported in Table 6. If the e¤ects of tax rate changes on leverage
are asymmetric, we should nd the estimated coe¢ cients on these interaction terms
to be signicantly di¤erent from zero. We do not nd any evidence for asymmetry
in Column 1 based on the positive-prot-only samplethe estimated coe¢ cients on
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Increasei;t MTRi;t 1 and Increasei;t 4MTRi;t are both insignicant.
Nonetheless, based on the full sample including loss-making rms, in Column
2 we nd that private rms in our sample respond more to a tax rate decrease in
the long run than to tax rate increasethe estimated coe¢ cient on Increasei;t 
MTRi;t 1 is both negative and signicant at the 5 percent level. The estimated
coe¢ cient on Increasei;t4MTRi;t is also negative although it is insignicant. In
Column 3, we use the perfect-foresight MTR as a proxy for the tax incentive to
use debt and we continue to nd a smaller long-run reaction to an increase in the
PMTR than that to a decrease in the PMTR. In this specication, we also nd
some evidence for a smaller response of leverage to increase in the PMTR in the
short run, as the estimated coe¢ cient on Increasei;t  4MTRi;t is negative and
signicant at the 10 percent level. It is worth noting that we only nd a signicant
asymmetric e¤ect when we include loss-making rms. Thus, our result suggests that
moving into a loss-making positionand therefore facing a lower e¤ective marginal
tax rateis associated with a more pronounced reduction in debt.
6.4 Domestic stand-alone rms versus multinationals: Ex-
ternal debt
In our sample around 70% of companies are stand-alone UK companies and
around 26% of companies belong to a multinational group. It is of policy interest
to analyze the e¤ects of taxation for such smaller, domestic stand-alone companies.
The response of the capital structure with respect to changes in the marginal tax
rate is also likely to be di¤erent between domestic stand-alones and multination-
als. First, unlike domestic rms, multinationals can allocate their debt internally
across di¤erent tax jurisdictions to reduce their worldwide tax liabilities (see, for
example, Desai et al., 2004). Moreover, multinational companies maysubject to
anti-avoidance ruleshave the opportunity to borrow externally in di¤erent juris-
dictions, and allocate internal debt so that high tax subsidiaries are nanced by
22
low tax entities in the same group. Second, UK multinationals were subject to the
worldwide tax system for foreign prots repatriation until 2009 (Arena and Kutner,
2015). Under the worldwide system, repatriated dividends form part of the taxable
income which we use to calculate the marginal tax rates. Thus, even at the un-
consolidated level, foreign prots repatriation may a¤ect multinationalsmarginal
tax rate.17 Thus as a robustness check, we focus on external debt in this section
and compare whether domestic stand-alone rms are di¤erent from rms that are
a part of a multinational group.
We identify whether a company is a domestic stand-alone or a part of a multi-
national group using information on companiesownership structure from FAME.18
More specically, FAME records whether a company is independent or not.19 If a
company is not independent, we know the name and location of its global ultimate
owner. We dene a company to be a part of a multinational group if it satises
one of the following criteria: 1) the company itself is independent and it has foreign
subsidiaries outside of the UK; 2) it is a subsidiary of a group with a UK ultimate
owner and which has foreign subsidiaries; 3) it is a subsidiary of a group with a
non-UK ultimate owner. We dene a company to be part of a domestic corporation
group if: 1) it is independent and has only domestic subsidiary; 2) or it is a sub-
sidiary of a group with a UK ultimate owner and which has no foreign subsidiary.
The rest of the sample are domestic stand-alone companies.
We provide summary statistics of key variables for domestic stand-alones and
17For example, when a multinational company repatriates dividends, the amount of repatriated
dividends are rst grossed up to reect the amount of repatriated before-tax prots. This amount
of grossed-up foreign prots is then added to the companiestotal taxable prots that are subject
to the UK corporation tax under the worldwide system. Foreign prots repatriation may a¤ect our
calculation of multinationalsmarginal tax rate as rms may be pushed into a higher tax bracket.
To avoid double taxation, companies can claim credits on foreign tax paid. If the corporate income
tax rate is lower in the host country than that in the UK, the companys tax liability to the UK
governent on repatriated foreign prots equals to the grossed-up foreign prots multiplied by the
di¤erential corporate income tax rate.
18A caveat of our approach is that the ownership information is only available for the most
recent year for each rm in FAME. Therefore, we need assume that rmsownership structures
did not change during the sample period.
19We dene a company to be independent if no other company owns more than 50% of its total
shares.
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for companies that belong to a multinational group in Appendix C.20 We observe
that relative to domestic stand-alones, companies that are a part of a multinational
group tend to be larger and less protable (indicated by size and protability). On
average, companies belonging to a multinational group report more taxable prots,
which suggests that they may face a higher marginal tax rate than domestic stand-
alones. Interestingly, companies that belong to a multinational group do not on
average have a higher leverage ratio. This is possible if multinational rms allocate
more debt in jurisdictions with a higher corporate income tax rate than that in the
UK. In Table C2, we also observe that both domestic stand-alones and multinational
companies frequently change their tax brackets.
Table 7 presents the GMM estimation results when the external leverage ratio is
the dependent variable in Equation (7). We estimate using the positive-prot-only
sample in Columns 1 and 2, and the full sample in Columns 3 and 4. Throughout
di¤erent columns in Table 8, we use the MTRi;t to capture the tax incentives
that rm i faces in year t, and use the lags of the MTR, together with lags of
leverage, tangibility and rm size, as the set of instruments. We continue to nd a
positive and substantial long-run tax e¤ect on capital structures when we focus on
domestic stand-alone companies (Columns 1 and 3). Companies that are part of a
multinational group also change their external leverage ratio when facing a change
in the marginal tax rate (Columns 2 and 4).
We obtain a somewhat mixed result comparing the sensitivity of external lever-
age toward changes in the tax incentives between the two types of rms. Based
on the positive-prot-only sample, the estimated long-run tax e¤ect on external
leverage for the two types of rms are similar (1.000 in Column 1 versus 1.104 in
Column 2). However, based on full sample, we nd the external leverage of rms
that are part of a multinational group is less sensitive to changes in tax incentives
than that for domestic stand-alone rms (0.285 in Column 4 versus 0.920 in Column
20We do not report the result using the sample of rms that are part of a domestic group as
they only consist of around 5% of the whole sample.
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3). This latter result suggests that there is possible substitution between external
and internal debt for multinationals, as discussed in Desai et al. (2004).21 And
such substitution e¤ect is perhaps stronger when a subsidiary is in the loss-making
position. The smaller sensitivity estimated for multinationals in Column 4 may also
relate to foreign prots repatriation, as discussed at the beginning of this section.
We also nd that companies that are part of a multinational group adjust their ex-
ternal leverage ratio much faster than domestic stand-alone companies (0.34 versus
0.27 based on the positive-prots-only sample, and 0.49 versus 0.29 based on the
full sample). This suggests that the a¢ liation to a multinational corporation group
may help reduce companiesadjustment costs associated with external borrowing.
7 Marginal tax rate based on tax returns: A bet-
ter measure to capture capital structure tax
incentives?
7.1 Tax returns versus nancial statements
The major advantage of using tax return data to study the e¤ects of corporate
taxes on capital structure is that it provides accurate information on companiestax
status. By contrast, tax incentive measures based on nancial statements are likely
to be infected with large measurement errors. It is well known that measurement
errors of this type will create an attenuation bias in the estimate. With matched
tax returns and nancial statements for a same sample of rms, we investigate the
importance of measurement errors in this section.
Table 8 illustrates the correspondence between the taxable income reported in
the tax return data and the estimated taxable income based on the accounting data
21To understand the tax e¤ects on capital structure for rms that are a part of a multinational
group, one needs to estimate a more sophisticated model in which rms can simultaneously choose
how much to borrow externally and internally, which is beyond the scope of the current study.
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from FAME, using both samples. It reveals considerable discrepancies between
these two data sources. In Panel A, based on the positive-prot-only sample, 18%
of observations within the £ 0-50,000 tax bracket "over-reported" taxable income in
nancial statement. This discrepancy is particularly severe when a company makes
a loss only around 50% of companies with taxable losses report a loss in their
nancial statements. The univariate statistics for these two types of taxable income
also di¤er considerably. For rms in the positive-prot-only sample, the mean of
taxable income reported in tax returns is £ 561,260 and that reported in nancial
statements is £ 680,197. The di¤erence is even larger for rms that ever make losses:
the average taxable income reported in tax returns is £ 121,865, compared with an
average of £ 525,264 according to the same rms nancial statements. This is
consistent with the observation above that a large proportion of rms report losses
in tax returns but not in nancial statements. Taking prot-making and loss-
making rms together, the sample average of taxable income based on tax returns
is £ 362,205 and that based on nancial statements is £ 610,010. The median levels
of taxable income from the two sources also di¤er substantially£ 40,580 based on
tax returns and £ 93,000 based on nancial statements. We report more details of
the distributions of the two types of taxable prots in Panel A. Overall, our analysis
reveals a non-trivial bias in taxable income estimated using nancial statements.
Panel B reports the correlations between di¤erent measures of the marginal
tax rate: the after- and before-nancing marginal tax rates calculated based on
tax return data, MTR and MTRbefore; the after- and before-nancing marginal
tax rates based on nancial statements, MTRFS and MTRFSbefore, as well as the
perfect-foresight marginal tax rate based on the two data sources (PMTR and
PMTRFS). Panel B reveals that tax rates based on tax returns and nancial
statements are rather di¤erent. We nd a partial correlation of around 0.6 between
MTR and MTRFS, and a similar correlation between MTRbefore and MTRFSbefore.
The correlation between PMTR and PMTRFS is only 0.5.
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Our observation of the discrepancies between companiesactual taxable income
and book income is consistent with the large literature on the existence of book-tax
di¤erences (Scholes andWolfson, 1992; Cloyd et al., 1996; Plesko, 2000; Manzon and
Plesko, 2001; Mills and Newberry, 2001; Desai, 2003). Such book-tax di¤erences
could arise due to di¤erent accounting rules for tax and for nancial reporting and
earnings management. Temporary book-tax di¤erences arise as tax and nancial
reporting may have di¤erent rules for revenue and expenses recognition, such as
how capital expenditures are depreciated. Permanent book-tax di¤erences arise as
revenue or expenses are accrued under one system but not the other. Moreover, as
tax returns and nancial statements are prepared for di¤erent purposes, companies
have some incentive to report low taxable income to the tax authority, and to report
high income in their nancial statements. Although large book-tax di¤erences may
increase the probability of being audited by tax authorities, previous studies suggest
that companies do not always conform their nancial statements to their tax reports.
Our analysis suggests that marginal tax rates measured based on nancial state-
ments are rather di¤erent from those measured based on tax returns. Thus, using
the former to estimate the tax e¤ects on leverage is likely to generate large bias
due to measurement errors, which points to the advantage of using actual tax re-
turns. To test whether measurement errors make a material di¤erence, we compare
the GMM estimation results of Equation (7) using two versions of the marginal tax
rate: one based on tax returns (MTR) and the second based on nancial statements
(MTRFS). We report the results in Table 9.
We start with the positive-prot-only sample, which is free of errors in the mea-
surement of the marginal tax rate. Results based on this sample should provide the
cleanest comparison. In Columns 1 and 2, we include the lags ofMTR (orMTRFS)
in the set of instruments (other IVs include the lags of leverage, protability, tan-
gibility, and rm size) in the di¤erence GMM estimations. In Columns 3 and 4,
we instead include lags of the before-nancing marginal tax rate (MTRIV before or
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MTRFS_IV before) in the set of instruments. We nd that only MTR based on
tax returns has strong explanatory power for corporate leverage (Columns 1 and
3), while the estimated coe¢ cient on MTRFS is not only smaller in magnitude
but also insignicantly di¤erent from zero (Columns 2 and 4). Thus, without the
availability of tax return data, we would conclude that there is little impact of the
corporate taxes on rmscapital structure choices.
We re-conduct the comparison between MTR and MTRFS using the full sam-
ple in Columns 5-8. In addition to the marginal tax rate, we also compare the
explanatory power of PMTR and PMTRFS. It is worth noting that using the full
sample including loss-making observations is likely to create measurement errors in
all these tax measures. Thus, we should interpret the results based on the full sam-
ple with caution. To alleviate measurement errors as much as we can, we exclude
the rst and last observations for each rm if it was in the loss-making position in
that year in the tax returns. In Columns 5-6, we continue to nd that only MTR
has strong explanatory power to corporate leverage, while MTRFS does not carry
signicant explanatory power for leverage either in the short run or in the long run.
Nonetheless, when we use PMTR or PMTRFS to capture tax incentives for debt
nancing (Columns 7-8), we obtain positive and signicant estimates for the coe¢ -
cients on both 4MTRi;t and MTRi;t 1 although the estimated long-run tax e¤ect
based on PMTR is signicant at the 5 per cent while the corresponding long-run
estimate based on PMTRFS is insignicant.
Results in Table 9 suggest that the marginal tax rate measured based on ac-
tual rm-level tax returns appear to have stronger explanatory power for our sam-
ple rmscapital structure choices, especially when we use the positive-prot-only
sample where rmsmarginal tax rates are most accurately observed in tax returns.
Using nancial statements to infer rmsmarginal tax rates, on the other hand, we
fail to nd strong evidence of tax e¤ects on capital structure. This result is likely to
due to the attenuation bias caused by measurement errors in the marginal tax rate
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when we use information only from the nancial statements, given the large book-
tax di¤erence we document earlier. Book-tax di¤erence is a common phenomenon
among rms in the US and other countries where the tax and nancial accounting
standards di¤er. Thus, one implication of our nding is that studies using marginal
tax rate based on nancial statement information, rather than tax returns, may
underestimate the true tax e¤ects on leverage.
To make our analysis more complete, ideally we need to compare the explanatory
power of two versions of the simulated marginal tax rate (SMTR, Graham, 1996a,
1996b), one based on tax returns and the other on nancial statements. As we do
not have information on losses in the tax returns, we are unable to construct the
SMTR based on tax returns. Admittedly, this is a limitation of our study. However,
in Table 8 we observe a rather poor correspondence between taxable prots from
the tax returns and the taxable income estimated using the nancial statements.
The comparison is especially poor when the company is in a loss-making position:
more than half of the observations reporting losses for tax purposes report positive
taxable income in the nancial statements. Therefore, the cumulative losses in tax
returns are also likely to be signicantly di¤erent from those reported in the nancial
statements. In addition, researchers normally use historical data of taxable income
to estimate its distribution, which is crucial to the calculation of the SMTR. Given
the substantial book-tax di¤erences we document in this section, it is possible that
the distribution of taxable income based on the tax returns is also di¤erent from
that based on nancial statements. For these reasons, there is likely to be large
measurement errors in the SMTR based on nancial statements, which in turn
could lead to attenuation biases in estimations.
7.2 Marginal tax rate versus average tax rate
Recent studies nd that many rms employ the average tax rate to make capital
structure decisions rather than the theoretically correct marginal tax rate (Graham
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et al., 2015). One of the arguments put forward is that the average tax rate is
perhaps more salient to managers. We investigate this issue in this section. To
construct the average e¤ective tax rate (AETR), we divide corporate tax liability
by taxable income. Both the numerator and the denominator of this ratio are
obtained from the tax returns. Our empirical analysis in this section is based
on positive-prot-only rms, which is not confounded by any measurement error.
Based on our calculation, the average e¤ective tax rate for rms in this sample is
around 23%.
To ease comparison, we rst report in Column 1 of Table 10 the same GMM
estimation result as in Column 3 of Table 4, where we use the marginal tax rate as
the proxy for tax incentives for using debt. In Column 2, we instead use the AETR
as the proxy. We do not nd any signicant long-run e¤ect of the AETR on
rmscapital structure as the estimated coe¢ cient on the AETR is insignicantly
di¤erent from zero. In the specication in Column 3, we include both theMTR and
the AETR and interestingly, while we continue to nd a signicant and positive
long-run e¤ect of the MTR on rmscapital structure, we nd no e¤ect from the
AETR. As robustness checks, we exclude bunching rms around the £ 10,000 and
£ 300,000 thresholds in Columns 4 and 5, and repeat the horse-racing exercise as
in Column 3. We continue to nd that only the MTR has explanatory power
for corporate leverage. These results suggest that rms in our sample use the
theoretically correct marginal tax rate for their capital structure decisions rather
than the average e¤ective tax rate. Taking together results we obtained in this and
previous sections, our estimated tax e¤ects on leverage based on tax returns are
strongly consistent with the trade-o¤ theory of capital structure.
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8 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the e¤ects of corporation tax on companiescapital
structure choices using matched condential tax return data and accounting data
for a panel of UK companies during the scal years 2001-2009. The rst purpose of
our study is to estimate the responsiveness of leverage with respect to changes in
rmsmarginal tax rate, which we measure based on actual rm-level tax returns
instead of nancial statements. Using a dynamic capital structure model, we nd
a large and positive long-run e¤ect of taxation on our sample companiesleverage
ratios, which is consistent with increasing evidence based on non-tax return data
that corporate tax is an important factor in rmsnancing decisions. The second
purpose of our study is to investigate whether using nancial statements alone
to infer rmsmarginal tax rate might lead to biased estimates. Our analysis
documents that tax incentives measured in the absence of tax returns could be
plagued with large measurement errors and consequently, the true tax e¤ects on
corporate leverage may be more substantial than has been found based on nancial
statements. One caveat is that our sample rms are private. Measurement errors
are likely to be even larger for publicly traded rms (Mills and Newberry, 2001).
Therefore, it will be interesting to investigate whether similar measurement problem
causes substantial bias in the estimated tax e¤ects on capital structure for listed
rms when appropriate tax return data become available.
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Figure 1: Statutory corporate income tax rate in the UK
Notes: This gure shows the statutory marginal tax rates for di¤erent corporate
income tax brackets in the scal years 2001 and 2008 in the United Kingdom. We
provide more detailed illustration of the statutory marginal tax rates during the
entire period 2001-2009 in Appendix A.
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Figure 2: Distribution of marginal tax rates
Notes: This gure plots the histogram of the statutory after-nancing marginal tax
rates for the full sample.
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Figure 3: Distribution of taxable income
Threshold at 300k
0
20
00
40
00
60
00
80
00
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 200000 400000 600000 800000 1000000 1200000 1400000 1600000
Bin width: 20,000 GBP
Notes: We provide the histograms of taxable income to illustrate rmsbunching
behaviour. This gure shows the entire distribution of taxable income for rms in
the positive-prot-only sample. We use £ 20,000 as the bin width when we plot this
histogram. The gure shows some bunching just below the £ 300,000 threshold.
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Figure 4: Distribution of taxable income around 10k, 50k, and 300k
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Notes: This gure shows in more details the distribution of taxable income around
the £ 10,000, £ 50,000, £ 300,000, and £ 1,500,000 thresholds, respectively. We dis-
tinguish between taxable income (red line), before-nancing taxable income (brown
bars), and taxable income before deducting capital allowances and after nanc-
ing (black line). This gure reveals some bunching just below the £ 10,000 and
£ 300,000 thresholds, as indicated by the relatively large spikes in the upper-left
and the bottom-left panels.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
A: Excluding loss-making observations (positive-prot-only sample)
Variables Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75 No. obs.
Taxable prots 561,260 2,344,378 39,551 138,420 401,850 51,051
After-nancing MTR 0.227 0.080 0.190 0.210 0.300 51,051
Before-nancing MTR 0.244 0.067 0.190 0.238 0.330 51,051
Size 14.590 1.639 13.430 14.826 15.651 51,051
Tangibility 0.430 0.320 0.146 0.353 0.706 51,051
Protability 0.086 0.104 0.026 0.055 0.108 51,051
Leverage 0.462 0.261 0.249 0.446 0.663 51,051
B: Loss-making rms
Variables Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75 No. obs.
Taxable prots 121,856 845,039 0.000 0.000 17,499 42,208
After-nancing MTR 0.070 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.190 42,208
Perfect-foresight MTR 0.131 0.115 0.000 0.178 0.210 42,208
Size 14.991 1.685 13.915 15.069 16.006 42,208
Tangibility 0.461 0.319 0.172 0.423 0.745 42,208
Protability 0.021 0.085 -0.014 0.013 0.048 42,208
Leverage 0.551 0.258 0.355 0.565 0.762 42,208
C. Tests of equal means
Di¤erence in means
Variables (Panel A-Panel B) T test statistics Wilcoxon test statistics
Taxable prots 439,404 36.620*** 194.813***
After-nancing MTR 0.157 253.562*** 178.342***
Size -0.400 -36.645*** -33.586***
Tangibility -0.031 -14.775*** -14.455***
Protability 0.065 102.939*** 126.548***
Leverage -0.089 -52.276*** -51.884***
Notes: Panel A summarizes the statistics of key variables for rms in the positive-
prot-only sample, which consists of 9,439 companies and 51,051 observations. Panel
B summarize the statistics of key variables for rms that ever experienced losses, which
consists of 42,208 observations. Denitions of these key variables are provided in Appendix
B. It is worth noting that we do not observe the actual level of losses for loss-making rm-
year observations. Taxable prots are recorded as 0 in the tax returns for loss-making
rms. As a result, we cannot compute the before-nancing MTR in Panel B. In Panel
C, we report results from the t-test and Wilcoxon test of the null hypothesis that the
two groups of rms have equal means of taxable prots, the after-nancing MTR, size,
tangibility, protability, and leverage. The stars indicate the signicance level of the T
test and the Wicoxon test statistics, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2: Transitional Probability Matrix of Taxable Prots from Year
t  1 to Year t
Positive-prot-only sample
t
Taxable Prots £ 0-50,000 £ 50,000-300,000 >£ 300,000
£ 0-50,000 73.68% 23.04% 3.28%
t  1 £ 50,000-300,000 14.05% 68.25% 17.7%
>£ 300,000 2.6% 17.47% 79.93%
Full sample
t
Taxable Prots Loss £ 0-50,000 £ 50,000-300,000 >£ 300,000
Loss 69.57% 16.04% 9.62% 4.77%
t  1 £ 0-50,000 19.98% 59.02% 18.30% 2.70%
£ 50,000-300,000 11.55% 13.81% 58.96% 15.68%
>£ 300,000 8.79% 2.89% 16.40% 71.93%
Notes: Panel A reports the transitional probability of taxable prots from one year to
the next for rms in the positive-prot-only sample. For condentiality reason, we groups
observations into three tax brackets: £ 0-50,000, £ 50,000-300,000, >£ 300,000. Each num-
ber in the diagonal indicates the probability of the rm stays in the same tax bracket
from year t  1 to year t. Each o¤-diagonal number indicates the probability of the rm
switching from one tax bracket to a di¤erent one from year t 1 to year t. Panel B reports
the transitional probability of taxable prots for rms in the full sample, including those
making taxable losses.
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Table 3: Number of Tax Status Changes within Companies
Positive-prot-only sample: Total number of tax status changes
No. of changes No. of companies % total companies No. of obs % total obs
0 2,385 25.30% 11,946 23.40%
1 2,618 27.70% 13,419 26.29%
2 2,450 26.00% 12,987 25.44%
= 3 1,986 21.10% 12,699 24.88%
Total 9,439 100% 51,051 100%
Positive-prot-only sample: Total number of moving in and out of the £ 300,000 tax
bracket
No. of changes No. of companies % total companies No. of obs % total obs
0 6,167 65.34% 32,001 62.68%
1 1,506 15.96% 8,173 16.01%
2 1,145 12.13% 6,508 12.75%
= 3 621 6.58% 4,369 8.56%
Total 9,439 100% 51,051 100%
Full sample: Total number of tax status changes
No. of changes No. of companies % total companies No. of obs % total obs
0 3,308 20.50% 16,882 18.10%
1 3,449 21.40% 17,836 19.13%
2 4,091 25.40% 22,274 23.88%
= 3 5,276 32.72% 36,267 38.89%
Total 16,124 100% 93,259 100%
Full sample: Total number of moving in and out of taxable losses
No. of changes No. of companies % total companies No. of obs % total obs
0 8,063 50.01% 44,041 47.22%
1 3,977 24.67% 22,414 24.03%
2 2,700 16.75% 16,705 17.91%
= 3 1,384 8.58% 10,099 10.83%
Total 9,439 100% 93,259 100%
Notes: This table shows information on the number of times companies changed tax
brackets. For both samples, we indicate how many companies do not change tax brackets
at all, or change once, twice or more than twice.
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Table 4: Estimated Tax E¤ects on Leverage
Positive-prot-only sample Full sample
Dep. Var: 4Levi;t (1)GMM (2)GMM (3)GMM (4)GMM (5)GMM
Levi;t 1 -0.238*** -0.222*** -0.250*** -0.247*** -0.203***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026)
MTRi;t 1 0.182** 0.261***
(0.083) (0.054)
MTRIV beforei;t 1 0.310***
(0.106)
PMTRi;t 1 0.242***
(0.062)
PMTRExcludei;t 1 0.226***
(0.079)
Profitabilityi;t 1 -0.272 -0.323* -0.376*** -0.268* -0.435**
(0.193) (0.190) (0.144) (0.141) (0.193)
Si zei;t 1 0.121* 0.113* -0.003 0.026 0.033
(0.072) (0.069) (0.055) (0.051) (0.081)
Tangibilityi;t 1 -0.268* -0.272** 0.027 -0.036 -0.193**
(0.137) (0.129) (0.079) (0.072) (0.084)
4MTRi;t 0.203* 0.359***
(0.116) (0.107)
4MTRIV beforei;t 0.196
(0.137)
4PMTRi;t 1 0.361***
(0.121)
4PMTRExcludei;t 1 0.275***
(0.127)
4Profitabilityi;t -0.163 -0.222 -0.558*** -0.490*** 0.275**
(0.249) (0.236) (0.181) (0.164) (0.127)
4Tangibilityi;t -0.164 -0.082 0.037 0.035 -0.647***
(0.166) (0.156) (0.114) (0.107) (0.224)
4 Si zei;t 0.102 0.112 0.062 0.074 -0.079
(0.073) (0.076) (0.070) (0.067) (0.120)
Long-run coe¢ cients
MTR 0.764** 1.044***
(0.379) (0.243)
MTRIV before 1.397**
(0.564)
PMTR 0.980***
(0.279)
PMTRExclude 1.115**
(0.443)
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Table 4 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hansen test 0.754 0.713 0.121 0.079 0.607
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000
AR(3) 0.620 0.728 0.888 0.592 0.330
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of groups 9,439 9,439 16,124 16,124 15,158
No. of obs. 32,173 32,173 61,011 61,011 50,906
Notes: We report the di¤erence GMM estimation results based on Equation (7). We
apply the di¤erence GMM estimator using the instrumenting strategy as explained in
Section 4. Levi;t is the rm is leverage ratio in year t, and MTRi;t is the statutory
marginal tax rate that rm i faced in year t. We use the positive-prot-only sample in
Columns 1-2. In Columns 1, we use the lags of theMTR, the lags of leverage, protability,
tangibility and rm size (dated at t-3 and t-4, similarly below) as a set of instruments
for current MTR and other endogeneous variables in the di¤erence GMM estimations. In
Columns 2, we include the lags of the before-nancing MTR, rather than the lags of the
after-nancing MTR, in the set of instruments. We estimate using the full sample in
Columns 3-5. In Columns 3, we useMTR as a proxy for the corporate tax incentives for
using debt. In Columns 4-5, we use the perfect-foresight marginal tax rate (PMTR) as
a proxy for the corporate tax incentives instead. In Column 3 (or 4 and 5), we use lags of
MTR (or PMTR), lags of protability, tangibility and size as instruments. In Column
5, we drop the rst or the last observation for each company if it reported a taxable loss
in that year. We also report the estimated long-run coe¢ cients on explanatory variables.
In this and subsequent tables, the long-run coe¢ cients are calculated as follows. Based
on Equation 7, the long-run e¤ect of the corporate tax rate on leverage is given by
(1 + 2)=(1   1), where 1+2 is the estimated coe¢ cient on the lagged MTR and
1 is the estimated coe¢ cient on the lagged leverage. The long-run e¤ect of other control
variables are calculated accordingly. We use the Stata command "nlcom" to calculate the
long-run coe¢ cients and the associated standard errors. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses, and are robust and clustered by rms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Excluding bunching rms
Positive-prot-only sample Full sample
Dep. Var: 4Levi;t (1)GMM (2)GMM (3)GMM (4)GMM
Levi;t 1 -0.243*** -0.227*** -0.242*** -0.238***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.026) (0.025)
MTRi;t 1 0.169** 0.248**
(0.085) (0.058)
MTRIV beforei;t 1 0.307***
(0.108)
PMTRi;t 1 0.218**
(0.066)
MTRi;t 0.169 0.337***
(0.114) (0.111)
MTRIV beforei;t 0.192
(0.134)
PMTRi;t 0.313**
(0.129)
Long-run coe¢ cients
MTR 0.698* 1.026***
(0.372) (0.267)
MTRIV before 1.357**
(0.560)
PMTR 0.915***
(0.307)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen test 0.613 0.473 0.154 0.063
No. of groups 9,199 9,199 15,856 15,856
No. of obs. 30,185 30,185 58,148 58,148
Notes: We exclude observations bunching below the £ 10,000 and £ 300,000 thresholds
and re-estimate based on Equation (7). We report the di¤erence GMM estimation results
based on the samples excluding bunching rms. In this and all subsequent tables, we rst-
di¤erence Equation (7) to get rid of the rm-specic xed e¤ects. Estimation in Columns
1 and 2 are based on the positive-prot-only sample. We use the lags of the MTR;the
lags of leverage, protability, tangibility and rm size as a set of instruments in Column 1,
and we include the lags of the before-nancingMTR in the set of instruments in Column
2. We report the di¤erence GMM estimation results based on the full sample in Columns
3-4. Short-run dynamics as specied in Equation (7) are included in all the columns.
We include rm size, tangibility and protability in each column but coe¢ cients on these
variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and
are robust and clustered by rms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Is the E¤ect of Taxation on FirmsCapital Structure Asym-
metric?
Dep. Var Positive-prot-only sample Full sample
4Levi;t (1) (2) (3)
Levi;t 1 -0.232*** -0.264*** -0.262***
(0.034) (0.026) (0.025)
MTRi;t 1 0.173* 0.282***
(0.089) (0.060)
Increasei;t MTRi;t 1 -0.038 -0.102**
(0.041) (0.049)
PMTRi;t 1 0.266***
(0.064)
Increasei;t  PMTRi;t 1 -0.098**
(0.048)
4MTRi;t 0.326 0.585***
(0.229) (0.211)
Increasei;t 4MTRi;t -0.121 -0.216
(0.282) (0.215)
4PMTRi;t 0.807***
(0.247)
Increasei;t 4PMTRi;t -0.478*
(0.260)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Company FE Yes Yes Yes
Hansen test 0.597 0.319 0.173
No. of groups 9,439 16,124 16,124
No. of obs. 32,173 61,011 61,011
Notes: In this table, we report the di¤erence GMM estimation results regarding the
asymmetric tax e¤ects on leverage. In Columns 1 and 2, we estimate the following model:
4Levi;t = 0 + (1   1)Levi;t 1 + (1 + 2)MTRi;t 1 + 3Increasei;t MTRi;t 1
+(1 + 2)Zi;t 1 + 14MTRi;t + 4Increasei;t 4MTRi;t
+14 Zi;t + i + t + i;t
Increasei;t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if rm is marginal tax rate based on tax
returns increases from year t   1 to year t. In Column 3, we use the perfect-forsight
MTR to proxy for the tax incentive. We use the third and fourth lags of the explanatory
variables as instruments. Short-run dynamics are included in all the columns. We include
rm size, tangibility and protability in each column. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses, and are robust and clustered by rms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Domestic standalone companies versus multinational com-
panies (GMM estimation results)
Positive-prot-only Full sample
Dep. Var (1) (2) (3) (4)
4EXLevi;t Domestic Part of MNCs Domestic Part of MNCs
stand alone stand alone
Levi;t 1 -0.262*** -0.336*** -0.285*** -0.490***
(0.040) (0.072) (0.040) (0.067)
MTRi;t 1 0.262** 0.371** 0.262*** 0.140*
(0.115) (0.161) (0.079) (0.077)
4MTRi;t -0.047 0.241 0.494*** 0.264**
(0.146) (0.213) (0.145) (0.110)
Long-run coe¢ cients
MTR 1.000** 1.104** 0.920*** 0.285*
(0.498) (0.545) (0.319) (0.167)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen test 0.295 0.594 0.067 0.060
No. of groups 6,466 2,458 10,545 4,597
No. of obs. 21,713 8,669 38,888 18,214
Notes: We report the di¤erence GMM estimation results based on Equation (7) where
the dependent variable 4EXLev is the rmsexternal leverage. In Columns 1 and 3,
we run the di¤erence GMM estimations using the sub-sample of domestic stand-alone
rms. In Columns 2 and 4, we run the di¤erence GMM estimations using the sub-sample
of rms that are part of a multinational group. We include the third and the fourth
lags of leverage, after-nancing marginal tax rate and other control variables in the set
of instruments. Short-run dynamics are included in all the columns. We also include
rm size, tangibility and protability in each column. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses, and are robust and clustered by rms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Correspondence between Tax Returns and Accounting Data in
terms of CompaniesTaxable Prots
Panel A: Taxable prots in the tax returns versus estimated taxable
prots using nancial statements
Positive-prot-only sample
Accounting data (FAME)
Taxable Prots Loss £ 0-50,000 £ 50,000-300,000 >£ 300,000
£ 0-50,000 8% 74% 14% 4%
CT600 £ 50,000-300,000 2% 7% 80% 11%
>£ 300,000 1% 0% 9% 90%
Taxable Prots Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75 Skewness Obs.
CT600 561,260 2,344,378 39,551 138,420 401,850 18.417 51,051
FAME 680,196 2,943,620 43,000 153,000 446,000 18.465 51,051
Full sample
Accounting data (FAME)
Taxable Prots Loss £ 0-50,000 £ 50,000-300,000 >£ 300,000
Loss 49.2% 16.5% 17.6% 16.7%
CT600 £ 0-50,000 10.4% 66.7% 17.1% 5.9%
£ 50,000-300,000 2.4% 7.1% 78% 12.5%
>£ 300,000 1.1% 0.3% 8.7% 90%
Taxable Prots Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75 Skewness Obs.
CT600 362,205 1,837,828 0 40,580 230,620 22.264 93,259
FAME 610,010 2,780,371 12,000 93,000 350,000 18.081 93,259
Notes: We observe companiestaxable prots in the tax returns and estimate their
taxable prots based on the nancial statements. We report the mean and standard
deviations (S.D.) of the two types of taxable prots, and we also report the value of
taxable prots at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the distribution. Skewness of
the distribution of the taxable prots is also reported. We calculate the correspondence
of tax brackets between the tax returns and the accounting data. For condentiality
reason, we group the tax brackets £ 0-10,000 and £ 10,000-50,000 together. For rms in
each tax bracket according to the tax returns (CT600), we calculate the percentages of
these rms in di¤erent tax brackets according to the estimated taxable prots based on
rmsnancial statements.
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Panel B: Correlation between Di¤erent Tax Incentive Measures Based
on Tax Returns and Financial Statements
Positive-prot-only sample
MTR MTRbefore MTR
FS MTRFSbefore
MTR 1
MTRbefore 0.703 1
MTRFS 0.688 0.594 1
MTRFSbefore 0.618 0.737 0.773 1
Full sample
MTR MTRFS PMTR PMTRFS
MTR 1
MTRFS 0.600 1
PMTR 0.807 0.528 1
PMTRFS 0.456 0.758 0.520 1
Notes: In this table, we calculate the partial correlations between di¤erent tax in-
centive measures calculated based on tax returns and nancial statements. MTR is the
after-nancing marginal tax rate, calculated based on companiestaxable prots in the
tax returns. MTRbefore is the before-nancing marginal tax rate, calculated based on
companiestaxable prots reported in the tax returns plus interest expenses. MTRFS
is the after-nancing marginal tax rate calculated based on the estimated taxable prots
according to companies nancial statement. MTRFSbefore is the before-nancing mar-
ginal tax rate calculated based on the estimated taxable prots before interest deduction
according to nancial statements. PMTR is the perfect-foresight marginal tax rate cal-
culated based on tax returns, and PMTRFS is the corresponding measure based on
nancial statements.
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Table 9: Does marginal tax rate measured based on tax returns better
capture tax incentives for borrowing?
Panel A Positive-prot-only sample Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Levi;t 1 -0.238*** -0.248*** -0.222*** -0.241*** -0.209*** -0.216*** -0.203*** -0.211***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
MTRi;t 1 0.182** 0.136**
(0.083) (0.054)
MTRFSi;t 1 0.016 0.051
(0.113) (0.085)
MTRIV beforei;t 1 0.310***
(0.106)
MTR
FS_IV before
i;t 1 0.120
(0.141)
PMTRi;t 1 0.226***
(0.079)
PMTRFSi;t 1 0.202*
(0.114)
MTRi;t 0.203* 0.226**
(0.116) (0.101)
MTRFSi;t -0.116 0.015
(0.148) (0.102)
MTRIV beforei;t 0.196
(0.137)
MTR
FS_IV before
i;t -0.110
(0.177)
PMTRi;t 0.275**
(0.127)
PMTRFSi;t 0.410***
(0.159)
Long-run coe¢ cients
MTR 0.764** 0.651**
(0.379) (0.284)
MTRFS 0.063 0.235
(0.455) (0.400)
MTRIV before 1.397**
(0.564)
MTRFS_IV before 0.499
(0.603)
PMTR 1.115**
(0.443)
PMTRFS 0.958
(0.601)
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Table 9 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen test 0.754 0.535 0.713 0.702 0.383 0.393 0.607 0.567
No. of groups 9,439 9,439 9,439 9,439 15,158 15,158 15,158 15,158
No. of obs. 32,173 32,173 32,173 32,173 50,906 50,906 50,906 50,906
Notes: We report the di¤erence GMM estimation results of Equation (7) where we cal-
culate the marginal tax rate (or the perfect-foresight marginal tax rate) based on either
the tax returns (MTR=PMTR) or the nancial statements (MTRFS=PMTRFS). The
dependant variable is 4Levi;t. In all these di¤erence GMM estimations, we include the
third and the fourth lags of leverage ratio, corresponding marginal tax rate and other con-
trol variables in the set of instruments. Columns 1-4 report estimation results based on
the positive-prot-only sample. In Column 1 (or 2), we instrument the rst-di¤erence of
MTRi;t (or that ofMTRFSi;t ) by the third and the fourth lags of theMTR (orMTR
FS),
and lags of protability, tangibility, and rm size. In Column 3 (or 4), we instrument the
rst-di¤erence of MTRi;t (or MTRFSi;t ) by the third and the fourth lags of the before-
nancingMTR (orMTRFS), and lags of other control variables. For the full sample, in
addition to the MTR (Columns 5-6), we also use the perfect-foresight marginal tax rate
as the measure for tax incentives based on the tax returns (PMTR) and based on nan-
cial statements (PMTRFS), separately in Columns 7 and 8. Year dummies are included
in all columns. We control for company-specic xed e¤ects by rst-di¤erencing Equation
(7). Short-run dynamics are included in each column but not reported. Firm-level control
variables are included. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are robust and
clustered by rms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10: Marginal versus average e¤ective tax rate
Excluding bunchers Excluding bunchers
at £ 300k at £ 10k and £ 300k
Dep. Var: 4Levi;t (1)GMM (2)GMM (3)GMM (4) GMM (5) GMM
Levi;t 1 -0.238*** -0.234*** -0.239*** -0.242*** -0.246***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
MTRi;t 1 0.182** 0.198** 0.176** 0.182**
(0.083) (0.092) (0.083) (0.087)
AETRi;t 1 0.046 -0.006 0.085 0.005
(0.086) (0.040) (0.174) (0.038)
4MTRi;t 0.203* 0.213* 0.198* 0.174
(0.116) (0.112) (0.112) (0.115)
4AETRi;t 0.027 -0.006 0.006 -0.002
(0.048) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019)
Long-run coe¢ cients
MTR 0.764** 0.832** 0.729** 0.739**
(0.379) (0.406) (0.363) (0.374)
AETR 0.196 -0.024 0.085 0.020
(0.375) (0.169) (0.174) (0.153)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen test 0.754 0.727 0.874 0.463 0.411
No. of groups 9,439 9,439 9,439 9,317 9,199
No. of obs. 32,173 32,173 32,173 30,908 30,185
Notes: AETR is the average e¤ective tax rate. We include the third and the fourth
lags of all the explanatory variables in each specication in the set of instruments for the
di¤erence GMM estimations. We use lags of theMTR and lags of other control variables
as the instruments. We compute the long-run coe¢ cients on the after-nancing marginal
tax rate and the average e¤ective tax rate. Short-run dynamics are included in each
column but not reported. Firm-level control variables are included. In Columns 1-3, we
estimate based on the positive-prot-only sample. In Column 4, we exclude observations
just below the £ 300,000 threshold. In Column 5, we exclude observations just below the
£ 300,000 and £ 310,000 thresholds. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are
robust and clustered by rms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix A: Statutory Marginal Tax Rates and Tax Brackets: 2001-2009
Taxable prots 2001/2002 2002/2003 - 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009-
2005/2006 2009/2010
0-10,000 10% 0% 19% 20% 21%
10,001-50,000 22.5% 23.75% 19% 20% 21%
50,001-300,000 20% 19% 19% 20% 21%
300,001-1,500,000 32.5% 32.75% 32.75% 32.5% 29.75%
>1,500,000 30% 30% 30% 30% 28%
Notes: This table displays the statutory marginal corporate income tax rates and the
corresponding tax bracket for UK companies during the scal years 2001-2009.
Appendix B: Denition of variables
Taxable income in tax returns: box 37 in CT600, which reports companies
actual taxable income after deducting interest expenses.
Estimated taxable income in nancial statement: we estimate companies
taxable income using nancial statements by adding tax expenses to net income,
which includes minority interest.
Statutory after-nancing marginal tax rate (MTR): this is calculated based
on companiestaxable income (either reported in tax returns or estimated based
on nancial statements, the latter is labelled as MTRA after deducting interest ex-
penses. For loss-making companies, this measure equals to zero.
Statutory before-nancing marginal tax rate (MTRbefore): this is calculated
based on companiestaxable income (either reported in tax returns or estimated
based on nancial statements, the latter is labelled as MTRAbefore before deduct-
ing interest expenses. If a rms before-nancing taxable prot is non-positive,
this measure is set to be zero. The schedule of statutory corporate income tax
rate in the UK during the scal years 2001/2002-2009/2010 is provided in Table A.
Perfect-foresight after-nancing marginal tax rate (PMTR): To construct
the perfect-foresight marginal tax rate, we make the following assumptions. If the
company is in a loss-making position in year t   1 and year t, the company must
carry forward its current taxable losses until year t + s when taxable prot be-
comes positive for the rst time. In this case, we set the e¤ective marginal tax
rate to be MTRt+s=(1 + r)s, where MTRt+s is the statutory after-nancing mar-
ginal tax rate the company would face in year t + s. The discount rate r is set
to be 7% which is the average interest rate for companies in our full sample.22 If
the company is instead able to carry backward its taxable losses to year t   1, we
assume that it takes time for the company to obtain tax refund from the tax au-
thority and set the marginal tax rate to be MTRt 1=(1 + r). We need to make
strong assumptions to calculate the perfect-foresight marginal tax rate as we only
22We experimented with a discount rate of 5% or 2% and the results are not a¤ected.
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observe up to 9 years for each company. If the company makes losses every year
we assume its marginal tax rate to be zero. This is a stronger assumption when
imposed on the rst and the last observations for each company. If the company
makes a loss in the rst year, we do not know whether the company can carry
backward the current losses. If the last observation is in a loss-making position, we
do not know whether the company carries forward its losses or not. As a result,
there may be larger measurement errors in these cases. This is the rationale to
omit the rst and the last observations as a robustness check in our estimations.
The corresponding measure based on nancial statements is labelled as PMTRA.
Leverage ratio (Lev): this is dened as(LTD + STD)=(LTD + STD +BE),
where LTD is long-term debt, STD is short-term debt, and BE is the value of the
companys book equity, all of which are obtained from companiesbalance sheets
provided by FAME.
Average e¤ective tax rate (AETR): this is dened as the ratio between gross
corporate income tax paid and taxable income. Both the numerator and the
denominator are obtained from the tax returns.
External leverage ratio (EXLev): this is constructed as (External debt)/(Total
debt). Total debt is the sum of internal and external debt, both reported in FAME.
Protability: this is the ratio of net income (prots/loss for the period) to to-
tal assets. Both the numerator and the denominator are obtained from FAME.
Tangibility: this is the ratio of tangible xed assets to total assets. Both the
numerator and the denominator are obtained from FAME.
Size: this is proxied as the logarithm of companiestotal assets.
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Appendix C
Table C1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables for Domestic Stand-alone
rms and Multinational Companies
Panel A: Positive-prot-only sample
Domestic stand-alone
Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75 No. obs.
Taxable prots 290,360 948,854 28,391 93,775 279,522 34,645
Size 14.124 1.557 12.934 14.289 15.272 34,645
Tangibility 0.461 0.328 0.163 0.394 0.774 34,645
Protability 0.092 0.114 0.026 0.056 0.115 34,645
Total leverage 0.470 0.264 0.253 0.453 0.675 34,645
Internal leverage ratio 0.050 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.000 34,645
Companies belonging to a multinational group
Taxable prots 1,227,098 4,134,946 109,937 318,880 850,636 13,585
Size 15.608 1.358 14.861 15.506 16.303 13,585
Tangibility 0.350 0.285 0.111 0.270 0.522 13,585
Protability 0.073 1.358 0.026 0.055 0.098 13,585
Total leverage 0.440 0.285 0.232 0.422 0.633 13,585
Internal leverage ratio 0.142 0.222 0.000 0.013 0.213 13,585
Panel B: Full sample
Domestic stand-alone
Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75 No. obs.
Taxable prots 194,761 781,047 0.000 34,094 161,268 59,978
Size 14.245 1.566 13.069 14.432 15.351 59,978
Tangibility 0.476 0.325 0.178 0.430 0.784 59,978
Protability 0.061 0.109 0.008 0.037 0.087 59,978
Total leverage 0.502 0.264 0.291 0.497 0.715 59,978
Internal leverage ratio 0.050 0.142 0.000 0.000 0.000 59,978
Companies belonging to a multinational group
Taxable prots 724,163 3,099,718 0.000 77,150 441,502 18,214
Size 15.763 1.427 14.904 15.634 16.524 18,214
Tangibility 0.369 0.292 0.117 0.299 0.565 18,214
Protability 0.048 0.083 0.008 0.036 0.079 18,214
Total leverage 0.496 0.262 0.286 0.494 0.705 18,214
Internal leverage ratio 0.190 0.257 0.000 0.048 0.328 18,214
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Table C2: Number of Tax Changes within Companies, by ownership
Positive-prot-only sample: Total number of moving in and out of the £ 300,000 tax
bracket
Multinational companies
No. of changes No. of companies % total companies No. of obs. % total obs.
0 1,273 51.79% 6,750 49.69%
1 578 23.52% 3,111 22.90%
2 384 15.62% 2,160 15.90%
= 3 223 9.08% 1,564 11.51%
Total 2,458 100% 13,585 100%
Domestic companies
No. of changes No. of companies % total companies No. of obs. % total obs.
0 4,894 70.1% 25,251 67.40%
1 928 13.29% 5,062 13.51%
2 761 10.90% 4,348 11.61%
= 3 549 5.70% 2,805 7.00%
Total 6,981 100% 37,466 100%
Full sample: Total number of moving in and out of losses
Multinational companies
No. of changes No. of companies % total companies No. of obs. % total obs.
0 2,155 46.88% 12,081 44.08%
1 1,185 25.78% 6,817 24.87%
2 803 17.47% 5,106 18.63%
= 3 454 9.87% 3,404 12.42%
Total 4,597 100% 27,408 100%
Domestic companies
No. of changes No. of companies % total companies No. of obs. % total obs.
0 5,908 51.25% 31,960 48.53%
1 2,792 24.22% 15,597 23.69%
2 1,897 16.46% 11,599 17.61%
= 3 930 8.07% 6,695 10.17%
Total 11,527 100% 65,851 100%
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